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452 WELLS V.LLOYD [21 C.2d 
denying the appellants' motion for leave to file a second 
amended answer, considered in conjunction with the appel-
lants' offer of proof, was not prejudicial. 
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider other. 
points presented by the appellants. 
The judgmEmtis· reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Spence,. J. pro tem., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
21,1943. 
[L. A. No. 1841.8. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1942.) 
MYRON .H. WELLS, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., Re-
spondent, v. ELWOOD LLOYD ·IV et al., Defendants; 
BANKOF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST ANDSAV-
INGS ASSOCIATION (a NatIOnal BankIng Association) 
. et al.,. Appellants. 
[1] 
[2] 
Appeal-Law of Case-Sufficiency of Evidence.-The doctrine 
of the law of the case applies to a decision on the sufficiency 
of the evidence. . 
Id.-Law of Case-Nonsuit.-A decision by a reviewing court 
that a .verdict could not be directed because of the conflict in 
the evidence and inferences properly deducible therefrom 
amounts to a ~ling that a finding of the jury for either party 
could not. be dIsturbed because of the conflict; and it is law 
of the case ·upon the question of whether the evidence is 
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury. 
[1] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 967; 3 Am. Jur. 553. 
l\!IcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1340; [2J Ap-
peal and Err~r, §1338; [3] Appeal and Error, §1328; [4JAp-
peal and Error, § 1326; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1329; [6] Appeal 
and Error, § 1324; [7J Appeal and Error, §§ 1641, 1644; [8] 
Fraud, § 100; [9] Fraud, § 93(1); [10] Appeal and Error § 1088' 
[11] Fraud, § 93. ' , 
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[3] Id.-Law of the Case-Obiter Dicta.-Onappeal from a judg-
ment on a directed verdict, a determination as to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify submission of the case to the 
jury may not be said to be unnecessary so as not to become 
the law of the case where the appellant requested a reversal 
with directions to grant a motion for a nonsuit. 
[4]· Id.-Law 'of the Case-Decisions of What Court.-A decision 
on appeal made by a District Court of Appeal constitutes the 
law of the case after it becomes. final, and is binding on a sub-
sequent appllal to the Supreme Court. 
[5] Id.-Law of the Case-Erroneous Decisions.-The doctrine of 
the law of the case applies even though the appellate court 
may be of the opinion that the former opinion is erroneous. 
[6] Id.-Law of the Case-Examining Record.-The doctrine of 
the law of the case as applied to a determination With refer-
ence to the sufficiency of the evidence applies even though 
. the evidence is not quoted or cited in the opinion., . 
[7] Id.-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions-Conflict-
inglnstructions.-The material incorrectness in an instruction 
as to an essential principle is not generally . remedied by a 
correct declaration of the same principlein·another .instruc-
tion. But the giving of conflicting instructions does not war-
rant a reversal where the erroneous instruction contained an 
abstract statement of law, and other .instructions·contained 
a correct statement speciflcally adapted ,to the. ,facts,.and 
where, from a reading of the charge as a whole,and· frQm a 
reasonable construction from the standpoint of the probable 
effect on the jury, it appears unlikely that the JUry.followecl 
the general language. . . .. 
[8] Fraud-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Iiistrue:-
tions.-In a frand action, errors of,omissioninb1struetionidn 
failing to inform the jury that it can cletermhlewhether .the 
false statements were representations of fact .01:- mere· opiIi-; 
ion, and in failing to include the element .. of reliance, are 
harmless where the omissions are supplied by other instruc-
tions. 
[9] Id.-Trial-Instruction-ApplicabUity.-In· a fraud action, 
an instruction that plaintiff would not be bound by what an 
investigation would disclose where the jury found deception 
preventing complete investigation, was supported by the 
record. 
[7] See 24 Cal.Jur. 856. 
• 
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[10] Appeal-,-Review-Persons Urging Error-Estoppel.-An ap~ 
pellant cannot complain on ,appeal of error in an instruction 
given at the request of the respondent when an instruction 
requested by him contains the same 'error. 
[11] Fraud-Trial-Instructions-Conversations of Conspirators. 
-An instruction as to the jury's consideration of conversa-
tions of alleged co-conspirators tending to inculpate' the 
defendant bank was not subject to objection in view of the 
caution as to the prior necessity of finding that the bank was 
a party to the conspiracy. 
, APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John Beardsley, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action' by trustee in bankruptcy for damages sustained by 
bankrupt by reason of fraud. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
Freston,& Files, James A' 'McI.Jaughlin, G. L. Berrey, Louis 
Ferrari and Edmund Nelson for Appellants. 
Thurlow T. Taft, Tanner, Odell & Taft and Donald A. 
Odell for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The present appeal is the third in this 
action. On the first a judgment for plaintiff entered upon a 
directed, verdict was reversed on the ground that issues other 
than that pertaining to damages should have been submitted 
to the jury. (Wells v. Lloyd, 6 Cal.2d 70 [56 P.2d 517].) On 
the second appeal a judgment of nonsuit was reversed by the 
District Court of Appeal, which held that the evidence pro-
duced at the second ,trial was substantially the same as that 
presented at the first tdal, that this court had decided upon 
the first appeal that there was sufficient evidence in favor of 
plaintiff to justify submission of the case to the jury, and 
that the determination became the law of the case governing 
the litigation. (Wells v. Lloyd, 35 Cal.App.2d 6 [94 P.2d 
373 U A hearing in this court was denied. The facts under-
lying the controversy are set forth in the opinion of this court 
on the first appeal. 
[1] Defendants' principal contention on this appeal is 
that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of 
the case to the jury. Plaintiff relies upon the decisions of this 
[10J See 24 Cal.Jur.870. 
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court and the District Court of Appeal on the earlier appeals' 
as conclusive ,determinations of this question under the'doc<_ 
trine of the law of the case. (See Gore v. Bingaman, 20 Cat2d~ 
118 [124 P.2d 17] ; Penzinerv. We~t Amenca~Pinance~ OO.~;. 
10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ;Un~ted Dredg~ngqo. v. In-. 
dustriaZ Ace. Oom., 208 Cal. 705' [284 P; 922] ; TalZyv. G(1,n~' _ 
ahZ, 151 Cal. 418 [90 P. 1049] ; 2 Cal.Jur.944~) Ail'appellate, 
court's decision on the sufficiency of evidence comes, clearly 
within the doctrine. (Berry v. Maywood Mut., :W;Oo.~o..; 
One, 1a Cal.2d 185 [88 P.2d 705]; Estat~ of Baird, 19~, C~;" 
225 [223 P. 974] ; Young v. Southern Pacific .Qo.; 189 Oal,: 746" 
[210 P. 259]; Burr v. United Railroad~"J73 (Jal.21l [15,9: 
P. 584] ; Raymond'v. Glover, 144 Cal. ,548 [78 r. 31 ;"W~a?ef', 
v. Shell 00., 34 CaLApp.2d 713 [94. P.2d 364] ;'Frankm~v;, 
Bank of America; 31 Cal..App~2d 666 [88 P.2d 790];¥'cOor .. " 
mick v. Great Western Power 00.,134 Cal:App. 705 [2~'P;2d_ 
322].) [2] Defendants contend, however, thatwhilet~iscom; 
decided upon the first appeal that there wa~. suffiCIent e~­
dence in favor of defendant to preclude a dlJ,'ect~d verdict" 
for plaintiff, it did not determine that there ~~' sufficient evi~, 
dence in favor of plaintiff to warrant submISSIOn of the case 
to the jury. This, contention was made on the secoild appeal' 
and in disposing of it, the District Court of Appeal declar~d: 
"With this contention we cannot agree, because the SUPl'eme, 
Court in the previous opinion in positive and linequivocal' 
language directly states that the questions of proximate cause 
and the existence or nonexistence of a conspiracy should have, 
been submitted to the jury because the evide~ce in connection, 
therewith presented debatable questions. arid left room- fora 
reasonable difference of opinion." (W .ells ~. Lloyd, 35 Cal., 
App. 2d 6 [94 P.2d 373]at.p, 11.) Thex:,uli.ng ,by this eoui1.'. 
that a verdict could not be dIrected for plamtIff because -of the ',' 
confl.ict in the evidence and the inferences properly deducible, ' 
therefrom amounted to a rilling that a finding of the jury in. 
favor of either party could not be disturbed ,because of that 
confl.ict. (See Raymond v. Glover,supra.) [3]' Defendants 
also contend that the determination that there was sufficient evi-
dence to justify submission to the jury was unnecessary to the 
disposition of the first appeal and therefore did not become the ' 
law of the case. On the first appeal, however, defendants con-
tended not only that there was evidence that defendants were 
blameless, but that there wa." no evidence of fraud onthe part' 
.: -: 
'I 
'I 
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of the bank. They accordingly requested that the judgment 
be reversed with directions to the trial court to grant. their 
motion for nonsuit. The issue of sufficiency of evidence in this. 
respect was therefore properly presented to the court, and' 
since the ruling thereon would guide the court below on a new 
trial, it became the law of the case. (See Berry v. Maywood. 
Mut. W. 00. No. One, supra; Westerfeld v. New York Life 
Ins. 00., 157 Cal. 339 [107 P. 699J ; Porter v. Muller, 112 Cal. 
355 [44 P. 729J j Gwinn v. Hamilton, 75 Cal. 265 [17 P, 212] ; 
People's LUmber 00, v. Gillard, 5 Cal.App. 435[90 P. 556].) 
[4] If there was any doubt after the decision on the first 
appeal that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict 
for plaintiff, it was dispelled by the decision of the District 
Court of Appeal on :the second appeal, for the question was 
there squarely presented and decided and constituted the law 
of the case after the decision became final. (Gore v. Binga-
man, s.upra; Berry V. Maywood Mnt. W. 00. No. One, supra; 
United Dredging 00. v. In,dustrial Ace. Com., s~tpra; Otten 
v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 252 [191 P. 11].) Similarly, any doubt 
that the ruling on the first appeal established the decision on 
the sufficiency of evidence as the law of the case was dispelled 
by the decision on .thesecond appeal. It has been held that an 
appellate court's decision' as to the effect of a judgment as 
res judicata is the law of the case on a subsequent appeal. 
(People v. Holladay, 93 Cal. 241 [29 P. 54, 27 Am.St.Rep. 
186].) The District Court Clf Appeal's holding, therefqre, that 
the law of the caSe had been estaolished by the decision of 
this court on the first appeal is the law of the case on this 
appeal. 
[5] In an attempt to bring the. present case within the 
rule that earlier adjudications of ail appellate court are not 
controlling when the facts and circumstances on successive 
appeals are supstantia:lly different (see Erlin v. National 
Union Fire 111,8. 00., 7 Cal.2d 547 [61 P.2.d 756]; Sheets v: 
Sou:thern Pacific ao~, 1Cal.2d '40$ [35 P.2d 121]; Estate of 
Ba~rd, supra; Young v. Southern PacifiC 00., SUpra; Burns v: 
Jackson, 53Cal,App. 3,15 (200P. 80]), defendants contend 
that the present ease differs materially from that presented 
()n the two former appeals. There. is no contention that the 
evidence produced at the third trial differed substantially 
from that pro~uced at the former trials. On the contrary, it 
appears that WIth the exception of Elwood Lloyd's testimony, 
Dec. 1942] WELLS v. LLOYD 
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introduced only at the second and third.~ri~s, tbeevidence 
was essentially the same at all stages of, tlJ.'e liti~iitioIi: Lloyd's. 
testimony was merely cumulative and. was so C/laracterized 
by the District Court of Appeal on the second appeal.(Wetl~·· 
v. Lloyd, supra, at p. 9.) Thus, defendants' conteilti6ri 
. aniouritsat best to an assertion thatthe eVid,ence 'was :not fully'" 
considered at the previous trials, that the appellate courts 
erred in . their previous evaluations thereof, and .that the 
former opinions do not refer to or deal with (Jertainmatiers 
in the r~cord. The doctrine of the -law of the caseappIies everi. 
thOugh the appellate court tiIaybe of,theopitiiQn.that.t1i~ , 
'former decision is erroneoUS . (Pen?iner v. W e8J Americ,a~ 
Finance 00., supra; HoffmaTi v. Southern'Pd:Cijic 00.,215 
Cal:454; [11 P.2d 387] ; Newportv. HatiOn, 207;Cal~5i5 [279 
P.' 184] ; McEwen v. New York Life In~, Co., 187. Cal.. 144 
[201P; 577J j State of Baird, $upra;,Tdllyv. G!l.f;,ahl~ supra), 
and [6] evidence in the record in the earIler: decision 'is not 
'quoted or cited in the opinion. '(Estate 01 Baird, supra; WellS 
v. Lloyd, supra.) . . 
Defendants cite England v. Hospital Qf theGooa"Sa'moari~ 
tan, 14 Ca1.2d 791 [97 P.2d813], to supP9rtth(j~r contention 
that the earlier adjudications on sufficiency of the evidence 
are not controlling on this appeal. It w~s there held that if 
the applicable rul~ Of laV\'; is altered.or:'cla~ifiea Inthe,.intervai 
between the first arid second appeals the court on the second 
appeal ~h9Uld decide, the case a,ccordingtQ t4~,i'Ule.as altere~; 
or clari:fied~ There is no' que~tion . here ofch;~ng~,or clarffica-, 
tiori of rules, but onlyof thl;l effect of an' :appeUate court's de-
cisioi;i.on . tnesUf6.ciencyof. the evidence.·.· . 
[7] It is also contimded that the j:ndgment l~ho1ildbe re-
~ersed,beca:;use oferror~. COnit:tlitted.byth:e', tl'i~f ~o.l1rt,~~/i:n;­
structi'ng . the jury. Attention is dir~ct¢d to, p~ai~#~:'s 'ii!str,nc- . 
tioll 17 ,which in eft~ctinformedt~e.j~ry. thlJ.t 8;' false'repre., 
• 
. seritatioh ,is. h'lgally. fra udulep.t '~whethe~'k:p.owUigly· Jjiade~'o'r' 
whether made through. ign.o~/;lIl(Je, car~leSsJiesS ,. c)r' mistaIri\.~·' 
PlaIntiff admits that this instruction was mOnebu~':iil' that it . 
perIri.ittec1. the Jury to findagitihsttlle .llfitik 'r~glitdl~sS:of th.e· 
question 'of good fiith, but (jontends . th.at'the:~rrof was rend-. 
ered h~rmless byotherinstrJJ,ctions cbrtectti ·sta.tiIlg th.eta,,', " . 
Plaintiff's instruCtion 16 and ,defepcilw.t"s l~structiQn' 26-G .' 
1>rope:rlyinforined, the' jury that to be . actionable tire false 
statements or representations·.must: either hav~' been ~ade·ln, 
\ , 
t 
i 
I' ! "J 
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the knowledge that they were false or else have been unwar-
ranted by the information of the person or persons making 
them. Instruction 26-G added the following direction: "If 
you :find that the allegedly false representatIons which plain-
tiff relies Upon were actually made in good faith and not 
recklessly, you must bring in a verdict for the defendants 
, . . . Since men are presumed to act in good£aith you must 
,assume that all' representations, whether true or ~alse, w.er/il 
made in good faith, unless the contrary is established by clear 
proof and satisfactory evidence." Although defendants con •.. 
cede that instructions 16 and 26-Gtogether accurately state 
the law as to fal,se representatigns, they contend that these 
. instructions conflict with instruction 17 and were boUnd to 
confuse the jury. If the statement to the jury of an essential 
principle of law is materially incorrect, the error is n6tgert~ 
erally remedied by a correct declaration of the samepririciple 
'in another instruction. (Sheets v. Southern Pacific Co., 21~ 
.Cal .. 509 [299 P. 71]; Starr v. Los Angele$ Ily. Corp.; 187Cal, 
270 [201 P. 599]; Heydenfeldt v. Osmont, 17.8 CaL768 [175 
P. 1]; Pierce v. United Gas db Electric Co.,. 161 C~1.176 {lIB 
,Po 700] ; Soda v. Marriott, 118 Cal.App. 635 [5 P.2d 675}: 
Zolkosk v. United States Farm db Land Co., 72 Cal.App. 63 
. [236 P. 344].) It is ordinarily Jmpossible to determine which 
of the. conflicting rules was followed by the jury. It does not 
follow, however, that the giving of conflicting instructions 
will always mislead. the jury and warrant a reversal. (Miner 
_v. Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp., 219 CaL 580 [28 P.2d23] j Loeb 
v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 P.2d 199].) In reviewing in-
structions, the appellate court must read the charge as a whole 
and give the instructions a reasolll:lble construction from the 
standpoint of their probable effect upon the jury. (Douglas 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390 [264 P. 237] ; Taylor v. 
Pacific, Electric Ry. Co., 172 Cal. 638 [158 P. 119] ; Krohn v. 
Patrick, 12Cal.App.2d 339 [55 P.2d301] ; 24 Cal.Jur. 856;) 
Thus, in appraising the instructions given in Loeb v. Kim-
,merle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 P.2d 199], this court concluded that 
the giving of conflicting or contradictory instructions was not 
ground for reversal of the judgment when the instruction con-
taining the misstatement of law was in,volved and. obscure as 
compared with the clear and explicit charge embodying the 
correct statement of law. In the present case instruction 17 
contained an abstract statement of law while instructions 16 
Dec,. 1942] WELLS 1.1.. LLoYD (21 a.2d 4.521 
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and 26-G were ~pecificallyadapted to the facts of the case. It 
is unlikely that the jury followed the general language -of 
the abstract instruction' rather than the expli<iitand emphatic 
charge applying the law to the facts oft~e particular situa-
tion. (See' Nickell v. Rosenfield, 82·· Ca1.App.3~9 .' [255 P. 
760]',) ". ,;' ..... . . 
; : [8] It is- contended that instruction. 17 failed to inform 
the jury that it could determine whether-the fa1sestatemen~s 
-Were representations of fact or mere opinions. Simi1ar~~, 
plaintiff's. instruction 15, defining the elementso~ ,fraud, ~s. 
attacked' for failure to include the element ofrehance. T~e 
iHleged errors, however, were errors of omission; and the omis-
sions in both instructions were supplied by instru,ction 16 so 
that no' prejudice res~lted therefrom .. (Miner. :v; . Dabne!i",i-
ifohnsonOil Corp., supra; Soda v.Marriott, supr:a; People v; 
Lang Transportation Corp:; 43 Ca1.App.2d 134 [110 P.2d 
464]. ) - . ' .': .. 
[9] Plaintiff's instruction 19-]) informed the'jurythat 'if 
it should find decept~on by the alleged conspirators that· pre~ 
ve~ted a complete investigation as to the truth of the repre~ 
sentations. plaintiff was not bound by what an . investigation 
would disclose. Appellants do not challenge the rule enun: 
ciat~d therein, but contend that there WIl:S no evidence 9fany 
q.eceptio~ to warrant the giving of the instruction. The in-
struction, however, is supported by the record. There was 
evidence that Bay Cities proposed tb make an independ~nt 
iri'vestigation of the value. of the bonds it was to receive; that 
the: '.proposed purchase was approved by the corporation's 
. board or directors on condition of their "being, satisfied as 
to the value"; that a committee composed of G.Behymer, 
. , . 
.r: n. Rishell and M. L .. Rishell was appointed by the board 
of directors to make the investigation; .~hat defendants Com". 
magere anq. Lloyd represented that Bay Cities would be abl~ 
to 'make the investigation while the deal was in escrow; ,that 
J-. D. Rishell, president of the corporation,went to San Fr~n.;, 
cisco to continue the investigation and before leaving in-
structed Stintin to get in touch with Behymer, the corpora-
tion is attorney, and open an escroW' that was ',hot to be closed 
until his return; that Stintin failed to get in touch with Behy':: 
IDer but did open an ~crow, and on the following day, ,de-
fendant' Commagere obtained the certificates deposited therein 
by Bay Cities and thereby in- effect closed the escrow. [10] 
• 
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Moreover, instruction 19 requested by defendant/:! related to 
the same issue. It is idle for a party to complain of a~ e:rror 
in an instruction given at the request of his adversary when 
an instruction requested by him contains that error. (Yolo 
Water & Power 00. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48 [186 P. 772]; 
George v. Oity of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App2d 311 [124 P.2d 
872]; Jesse v. Giguiere, 24 Cal.App.2d 160 [74 P.2d 310] ; 
see 24 Cal.Jur. 870.) 
[11] Defendants next complain that at plaintiff's request 
the jury was instructed that conversations of alleged co-
conspirators could be taken into consideration in determining 
whether the bank, even though no agent thereof was pre..'lent 
at the conversations, was a party to the conspiracy. While in-
struction 13 could have been clearer it is not open to the in-
terpretation of defendants. The jury 'Was expressly cautioned 
that unless it first foUnd that the bank had been established 
as a party to the alleged conspiracy, it could not consider the 
testimony regarding the conversations as tending to inculpate 
the bank. Plaintiff's instruction 11, allegedly including an 
implication that ~ppellants admitted the perpetration of a 
fraud by some of the defendants, likewise is not open to the 
suggested construction. In referring to fraud, the trial judge 
took care to add the qualifying words "if any," and in in-
struction 36 expressly cautioned the jury that' the existence 
of fraud could be determined only from the evidence and 
could not be inferred· from the instructions. 
Other assignments of error in the giving and refusing .of' 
instructions as well as in the admission of evidence and allow-
ance of comments before the jury have been examined. Upon 
a review of the entire record, it does not appear that the 
errors, if any, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Const., 
art. VI, § 4%; Code Civ. Proc. § 475.) The trial court, 
therefore,' did not err in denying defendants' motions for ,non-
suit, new trial, judgment notwithstanding verdict or the 
motion to strike the evidence at the close of plaintiff's case. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson., C. J., Shenk, J., Crirtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J. pro tem., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
21, 1943. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
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[L. A. No. 18419. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1942.] 
CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY' EXCHANGE 
(an Inter-Insurance Exchange), Petitioner, v. INDUS· 
TRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and JANE G. 
DUFFUS, Respondents. 
[1] . Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries--,.Transpor-
tation in Employer's Conveyance.-Where an employee, as an 
incident of the employment, is furnished with transportation 
to and :t;rom the place of employment and the means' of trans-
portation are under the con1rol of the employer, an injury sus-
tained by the employee during such transportation is Mmpen-
.sable. 
[2] ·Id.-Compensable Injuries-Transportation In Employer's Con-
veyance--Agreement.-An agreement :by an employer to fur-
nish transportation to employees. may be implied from, the 
circumstances and from the uniform c011rseo£ ,conduct of the, 
parties. An inference thereof maybe drawn from the facts 
that the employee, when hired, understood transportation 
would' be furnished, that on the first day of employment she 
rode in a car, and that she was then informed that it was the' 
company car and that a deduction from her wages for its use 
would be made. 
. [3] Id. - Compensable Injuries,- Transportation in Employer's 
Conveyance--Agreement.-An inference of an agreement by 
an 'employer to furnish employees with transportation is not 
precluded by his right to withdraw the privilege at any time, 
or by the employee's freedom to use other transportation. 
[4] Id.-Compensable Injuries--,.Transportation in Oonveyance...:.. 
Incident to Employment.-Where transportation is regularly 
furnished by an employer to' employees solely because of their 
status as such, it-may be inferred that transportation depends ' 
on the fact of employment and is incidental thereto: 
[5] Id. - Compensable Injuries- Transportation in Emplojer's 
Conveyance - Employee's Payment. - An employer's agree-
ment to furnish transportation to employees is not trans-' 
. [1] Inju.ry while going to or coming'from work, notes, 10 A.:ta.:R.., 
169; 21 A.L.R. ,1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R. 1438; 87 A.L.R. 250. 
See, also, 27 Cal.Jur. 383, 
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] W orkmen'sCompensation, § 100; 
. [6] Workmen's Compensation, § 77. 
• 
